This paper examines the impact of International Monetary Fund (IMF) announcements programs on different sectors of the economy. Previous studies approach this issue from the perspective of financial sector and/or composite index returns only; there is limited evidence on the impact of IMF actions on stock prices in non-financial sectors. This paper provides comprehensive evidence on the impact of IMFrelated announcements in different sectors of the economy during the Asian crisis. The results indicate that IMF actions affect sector returns asymmetrically, suggesting that investors have different expectations regarding the restructuring costs associated with IMF-imposed reforms in certain sectors. More important, the results that indicate the net wealth effects of IMF actions in private financial markets can be best understood by providing evidence from both financial and non-financial sectors.
INTRODUCTION
The impact of Fund programs during the Asian crisis is heavily debated. Some observers have argued that such programs restore investor confidence and are necessary for financial stability. For example, regarding the nature of IMF programs during the Asian crisis, then the Managing Director of the IMF, Michael Camdessus, stated: "Instead of austerity measures to restore macroeconomic balance, the centerpiece of each program is a set of forceful, far-reaching structural reforms aimed at restoring market confidence. The reforms included in these programs will require vast changes in domestic business practices, corporate culture, and government behavior" (IMF Survey, Volume 27(4), February 23, 1998, p.49) . On the other hand, others have argued that such structural and microeconomic conditions imposed by the IMF on these economies may undermine political support for necessary reforms and thus destabilize investor confidence (Eichengreen, 1999) .
In this paper, we examine how investors react to IMF-related news, announced during a financial crisis. We focus on the Asian crisis due to significant involvement of the IMF in the crisis. If IMF announcements indeed restore confidence, then we should expect some positive reaction to the involvement of the IMF during the crisis. On the other hand, if investors have reservations about the success of Fund programs and they believe that such programs demoralize their confidence and would bring costly reforms, then we expect negative reaction to actions of the Fund. A growing number of studies examine the impact of IMF actions in asset market returns. The majority of studies focus mainly on the impact of IMF-related news on international financial sector returns because this sector is believed to be at the center of the reasons for the financial crisis (Harvey and Roper, 1999; Krugman, 1998; Stiglitz, 1999) . There is no reason to believe that IMF actions would only affect returns in the financial sector. We also expect significant changes in other sector returns, such as those of services and real sector companies.
This paper provides evidence on the impact of the IMF-related news on stock returns at the sector level. How are sector returns affected by announcement of a battery of IMF events? Does IMF news have similar effects on all sectors, or some sectors gain more than others? These are difficult questions to answer. This paper constitutes the groundwork for future studies in the sense that it is the first one that examines the effect of IMF actions on the real side of the economy. To shed some lights on these issues, we use daily sector returns for Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea during the Asian crisis. To compare our results to previous studies, we employ the same sample period and the same set of events employed in Kho and Stulz (2000) who investigated the impact of IMF actions and programs on bank returns over the crisis period. Following Kho and Stulz (2000) , we use an event-study methodology to illustrate wealth relative gains in financial versus real sectors of the economy during the crisis period. We also provide time-varying GARCH estimation results, which was most apparent over the crisis period. We hope that this initial work will provide a yardstick for more detailed firm level analysis in the future.
In the next section, we provide a review of the literature. Section III discusses our data and event dates are provided in detail in Section IV. In Section V, we present our empirical results. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PREVIOUS STUDIES
There is scant literature on the effects of IMF events on financial markets. Available literature focuses on the response of international bank creditors rather than local financial companies. Kho and Stulz (1999) examined the impact of IMF assistance on the value of bank stocks, both local and international, during the Asian financial crisis. They concluded that the IMF programs had a positive but small effect on international bank values, while the effect on crisis countries' banks was insignificant. In a related study, Dong, Kho and Stulz (2000) investigated the impact of the announcement dates of IMF support programs on the abnormal returns of the U.S. banks during crises, and they reported similar results as in Kho and Stulz (1999) in that these banks tend to earn high abnormal returns. Zhang (2001) investigated the impact of the IMF announcements during the Asian crisis on international bank equities in Korea and found evidence consistent with Kho and Stulz (1999) and Dong et al. (2000) . Zhang (2001) also shows that groups that were more exposed to crisis countries experienced a more positive equity response. Overall, these studies found that IMF news has a significant positive influence on international bank returns, but the impact on banks of crisis countries is either not studied or briefly mentioned as insignificant. Brealey and Kaplanis (2004) looked at a broad sample of IMF programs, other than those implemented during the Asian crisis, and they covered a wider range of financial assets than those included in Kho and Stulz (1999) and Dong et al. (2000) . They found a substantial decline in a variety of asset prices in the weeks leading up to the announcement of the IMF programs, but there was no evidence that the announcement of the IMF support caused any part of these wealth losses to be reversed. They argued that IMF intervention could not be interpreted as successful in shifting financial markets from a bad to a good equilibrium: investors can not count on the IMF programs to remedy their losses. Evrensel and Kutan (2004) examined the changes in daily financial sector stock returns of Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand in response to IMF-related news during the Asian crisis. They find that news of program negotiations and approval increases financial sector returns in Indonesia and Korea. In Thailand, only program approval is associated with higher returns in the financial sector. Assuming the presence of domestic implicit guarantees in the financial sectors of the sample countries, they interpreted the changes in financial sector returns, especially on the day of program approval in Thailand and Korea, such that investors may expect the continuation of these guarantees under the future IMF program. Hayo and Kutan (2005) investigated the reaction of composite stock market returns and volatility in a diverse group of six emerging markets to a set of IMF events. They found that, on average, negative (positive) IMF news reduces (increases) daily stock returns by about one percentage point. The most influential single event was the delay of loans from the IMF, which reduced stock returns by about one and a half percentage points. IMF news does not appear to have a significant impact on the volatility of stock markets, which may act as a proxy for risk. They therefore concluded that IMF actions primarily have an effect on investor wealth, but not on investment risk. The paper that is closely related to ours is the recent investigation by Evrensel and Kutan (2006) who studied the changes in daily financial sector stock returns in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand in response to IMF-related news during the Asian crisis and compare them with those in non-financial sectors. The key difference between this study and ours is twofold. First, their news set includes only two variables, namely IMF program negotiations and their approval. On the other hand, our paper includes a richer set of news as reported in Kho and Stulz (1999) that captures the dynamics of the Asian crisis. Second is that Evrensel and Kutan (2006) do not report any estimates of abnormal returns on sector returns, but we do.
Recall that the Kho and Stulz study does not focus on a comprehensive set of sector returns as we do.
Also, our analysis differs from many of the previous studies. First, we use sector-level returns. Previous studies focus on international bank stock returns, financial sector returns or composite (aggregate index) returns. Because a typical risk-averse investor tends to hold a portfolio of assets from different sectors, rather than shares from only a few sectors, the overall wealth implications of IMF actions for investors may be best captured by a sector-wide analysis. If IMF-related news increases financial sectors returns, but decreases returns in other sectors, a portfolio-investor may end up with a welfare loss. Second, we attempt to overcome some of the methodological shortcomings of the previous studies, such as using an estimation procedure that ignores the typical finding of time-varying volatility observed in emerging stock market returns (e.g., Bekaert and Harvey, 1997) , although the crisis certainly induced a timevarying volatility in returns. Third, some studies do not include a control variable to capture the general evolution of stock markets. We use a Capital Asset pricing Model (CAPM) framework, which is pretty standard in finance literature.
III. DATA
Data on the stock prices is derived from DataStream. Both the country indexes and the sector indexes we used are local currency based 1 and are from the International Finance Corporation (IFC) that focuses on large and relatively liquid securities which foreign investors are more likely to invest, and these indices have certain advantages over more comprehensive local indices (Kang and Stulz, 1997) .
These indices are calculated for all markets in a similar fashion, which makes international comparisons of returns possible. Furthermore the country indices attempts to cover 70% of market capitalization (Bekaert and Harvey, 1995) . The sample period starts on January 15, 1997 and ends on July 15, 1998 2 which covers all IMF-related events during the Asian crisis.
Using a similar sample period employed in earlier studies, we estimate the impact of IMF related announcements during the Asian crisis on stock returns in following sectors 3 and the Banking (BANK) industry which we use to compare our results to previous studies, Basic Industries (BIND), which includes chemicals, construction and building materials, forestry and paper, steel and other metals, NonCyclical Consumer goods (NCYCG), which is composed of Beverages, Food, Health, Personal Care, Pharmaceuticals and Tobacco Products; Cyclical Services (CYCS), including retailers, Leisure and Hotels, Media and Entertainment, Support services and Transport; Financials (FIN) that include banks, insurance companies, life assurance, investment companies, real estate and other specialty finance companies and General Industries (GIND) that include Aerospace and defense, electronic and electrical equipment, engineering and machinery. Appendix 1 provides the names and definitions of these industries.
We use daily values of the country indices for Thailand, Indonesia and Korea and a total of 18 different industry indices, and the corresponding market indices of these countries. We compute the stock returns, R t , using the logarithm of the first-differences of the indices, which gives continuously compounded returns. Figure 1 shows the evolution of industry and market indices for these countries. In Thailand the markets index declined from 100 to 22 during the research period. The most dramatic movements. During the market crisis, the exchange rates were quite volatile; using domestic-currency based returns allows us that the results are not significantly influenced by exchange rate changes. 2 Kho and Stulz (2000) use the same sample period to investigate bank returns over the crisis period. We use their sample period for comparison purposes. 3 It would be interesting to study the long-term performance of industries using a larger sample period. In this paper we focus on the impact of IMF news during the crisis period, which allows us to compare our results to previous studies. decline was in the general industries' index (GIND) from 100 to 8 followed by financial companies' index (FIN) and banks (BANK) from 100 to 15 and 18 respectively, which the previous literature mainly identified as the problem sector during the crisis period or earlier. The indexes for basic industries (BASIC), cyclical consumer services (CYCS) and non-cyclical consumer services fell from 100 to 20, 49 and 63 respectively, during the same period. In Indonesia the market index declined from 100 to 78 during the research period. During the same period the index for non-cyclical consumer services (NCYCS) and basic industries (BASIC) increased to 150 and 137 respectively. The index for financial companies (FIN) has declined to 54 from 100 while the index for banks declined even further to 22 from 100. The index levels for general industries (GIND) and cyclical services declined even further to 11 and 17 respectively. In Korea during our research period the market declined from an index level of 100 to 67. During this period the index level for companies in financial sectors (FIN) and banks in particular declined most from 100 to 27 and 17 respectively. Non-cyclical services (NCYCG), General industries (GIND) basic industries (BASIC) and cyclical consumer services (CYCS) index levels also declined to 91, 81, 63, and 40, respectively. *****insert figure 1 here***** Table 1 *****insert table 1 here***** As expected during a crisis period, static volatility as measured by the standard deviations of daily returns is generally quite high in a magnitude of about 4% within a range of 3.3% to 8.1%, while the range of daily mean returns is between -0.6% to 0.1%. There is excess kurtosis in almost every return series and we must deal with it when we run the regressions later. Also most series exhibit a certain degree of skewness and that has to be dealt with as well. The methodology we use below in our estimations is employed accordingly.
The decision to select IMF-related events is a difficult one. Usually there is a sequence of events that lead to the official announcement of a rescue package by the IMF. In this paper, we follow Kho and Stulz (2000) and use their news for our sample countries. Kho and Stulz (2000) extract their news from the website of Noriel Robini on the Asian crisis and these news are also in line with those used by Lau and McInish (2003) and Zhang (2001) who also investigated bank returns during the Asian Crisis. We describe the IMF related events in Table 2 and present a chronology of event windows we use in our estimations. The major problem with this approach is that during the period we focus on IMF-related announcements, these are not the only events that that could affect stock returns. Hence, significant coefficients may have nothing to do with IMF-related announcements or it might be the case that they might have too small an effect as individual events but the cumulative impact might be significant 4 .
The list of IMF related events given in Table 2 indicate four IMF-related events for Thailand, starting with the central bank calling for IMF for technical assistance on July 2, 1997, and ending with the IMF's approval of a $3.9 billion credit on August 20, 1997. There are nine IMF-related announcements for Indonesia, starting with financial assistance request from the IMF on October 8, 1997 and ending on April 8, 1998, with the agreement of a $40 billion bailout package that includes major reforms. Six IMFrelated events for Korea start with the search for a rescue package from the IMF on November 21, 1997 and end with the release of an additional $2 billion release on February 17, 1998, following a record loan package of $60 billion in December 1997. *****insert table 2 here****** Table 3 reports the daily local market returns as well as the sector returns for the key dates in Thailand, Korea and Indonesia. We consider the key dates to be the days with announcements of IMF related events including the crisis country asking for financial assistance from the IMF, program negotiations and release of IMF loans. Investors expect particular effects on firms in different industries when IMF is called for technical assistance. Once a Fund program process starts, negotiations are mainly geared towards the determination of the size and conditions of the program loan, and investors do not have an idea about these until the announcement of an agreement. We deal with the duration of IMF negotiations by treating the period as a separate "duration" variable later in section 4.3 in our econometric estimations, so as to capture this uncertainty. The returns we report in table 3 5 are the raw returns on the day of a given IMF-related event.
In Thailand, market participants reacted most positively to the decisions of the Bank of Thailand and the government's call for IMF technical assistance on July 2 and July 28, 1997 with market returns of 8.7% and 6%, respectively. Sector returns vary between 9.4% (CYCS) and 6.3% (NCYCG) on July 2, and between 7.8% (NCYCS) and -3% (NCYCG) on July 28. The biggest negative reaction is to the announcement of program negotiations on August 5, 1997 which we interpret as an adjustment to the overreaction to the initial call by the government for help from the IMF. Market return on August 5 is -2.1% and the range of returns are between -4.3% for CYCS and NCYCS and 0.2% for Finance (FIN) firms.
In Indonesia, the relationship between the IMF and the government was problematic during this period due to ongoing political and social instability in the country and the well-publicized corruption that induced further uncertainty on the ownership and implementation of IMF programs. Market participants reacted most positively to the March 26, 1998 decision of the Indonesian government to agree on a comprehensive package of returns in exchange for a $40 billion bailout after about six months of ups and downs in the relations with the IMF. The market return was 5.8% and sector returns vary between 10.4% (CYCS) and 0% (GIND) on this day. The biggest negative reaction was to the announcement of program negotiations on January 13, 1998 when IMF and Indonesia appear to be near and agreement on a $23 billion package which is about half the final package that was agreed three months later. Market return on January 13, 1998 was -7.5% and the range of returns were between -13.3% (CYCS) and 0% (GIND).
In Korea, market participants reacted most positively to the decision of the IMF board meeting in Washington that considered the Korean request to speed up the delivery of the first portion of the $60 billion bailout package. Market returns was 11.3% and sector returns were between 12.6 %(FIN) and 2.5 % (NCYCS) upon the speeding up the liquidity injection news. The largest negative reaction was to the December 24, 1998 announcement of the release of the first $2 billion on December 24 which constitutes an adjustment to the overoptimistic expectations established a week before in December 15. Market return on December 24 was -3.4% with the range of returns being between -6% (CYCG) and 0.7% (NCYCS).
IV. METHODOLOGY
We first investigate the extent to which IMF-related announcements (as listed in Table 1 ) have an effect on asset values, using the standard event study methodology. We look at the changes in stock returns separately for each industry. We use the market model and calculate abnormal returns for each industry as the returns in excess of risk adjusted expected return for each industry estimated using CAPM.
The abnormal return of sector j of country k on day t, AR jkt , is defined as the difference between daily return, R jkt , and the expected return based on the estimated coefficients of the market model: AR jkt =R jkt -(α jkt +β jkt M kt ). The return on day t is the log difference in stock prices between two successive days, P jkt and P jkt-1 . Market return (M kt ) is defined in a similar fashion as the log difference of the levels of the Composite Index in the country of interest, k in two successive days while α jk and β jk are estimated coefficients for sector j in country k from the CAPM regressions. We calculate Cumulative abnormal returns for each industry j (CAR j ) and test if they are different form zero following the procedure and using the test statistics as described below (Brown and Warner, 1985; Campbel, Lo, MacKinley, 1997) .
where, s(ACAR T )= s(AR T )/(T+1) ½ and s(AR T ) is the variance over T days.
Next, we introduce the econometric models used. In order to understand whether the exposure of different industries in Asian countries were different to IMF-related announcements we account for the impact of market using a standard CAPM framework for pricing the securities 6 . This allows us to account for shocks to aggregate economic activity through the exposure of each industry to their countries' stock market 7 . When market participants learn about IMF announcements, prevailing stock prices incorporate that information in a forward-looking manner, reflecting information about expected future economic activity. We also account for possible autocorrelations in daily frequency data by using up to five self lags and report Q test statistics up to five lags to make sure that our models do not suffer from additional serial correlation in every industry. The regressions we reproduce are estimated using a GARCH(1, 1) process.
Using a GARCH formulation is important for our purposes, as this was not done in previous studies (e.g., Kho and Stulz, 2000) , and it captures the time-varying volatility of returns during the crisis. Other authors investigating the impact of IMF announcements have used OLS estimations and SUR method 8 . The advantage of the SUR method is that it accounts for the impact of significant correlations across error terms in a set of equations. We preferred to use a GARCH (1, 1) 9 process both at the country level analysis and in panel estimations as this is a more appropriate way of taking into account the properties of stock returns. We model variance conditional on its past values and thus take into account the heteroscedastic disturbance terms. We use a Bollersev-Wooldridge heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix to account for the non-normality of the returns. Our inferences are therefore more reliable compared to those from OLS estimations 10 .
We estimate the following GARCH (1, 1) 8 See Dewenter and Hess (1998) and Kho and Stulz (2000) for details) 9 We also estimated a GARCH-M model whereby we employed the standard deviation as a measure of risk to estimate the mean equation, but the coefficients for this variable are not significant and results do not qualitatively change. 10 We use the same data sources and same estimation period with Kho and Stulz (2000) who work with the banking sector only. We include news from Kho and Stulz for our sample countries only, although they report news for others, such as Hong Kong. Our banking sector estimations are comparable to them; however, we detect the impact of IMF announcements that they fail to detect mainly because of the more appropriate estimation method we employ. 11 We also estimated an alternative version with the inclusion of IMF dummies in the variance equation where coefficients were generally not significant. This is consistent with Hayo and Kutan (2005) and results not reported here for space consideration but they are available from authors upon request. 12 We also estimated this equation using an alternative definition of the IMF dummy that captures the 3 to 5 day period around the event as information could be reflected already before the announcement. Conclusions do not change. Results not reported here due to space limitation are available from authors upon request.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Cumulative Abnormal Returns during the Asian Crisis
We report Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 13 for different industries during the crisis period in Figure 2 and Tables 4 to 6. We start cumulating abnormal returns for each industry at the beginning of the research period and cumulate returns for 392 days until the end of the research period. CARs for respectively at the end of the period. The top performers were Basic Industries(BASIC) and Non-Cyclical Services (NCYCS) with consistently increasing cumulative abnormal returns that reached 46% and 67%
respectively at the end of the crisis period. The companies in general industries (GIND) are those in aerospace and defense, electrical and electronic equipment, engineering and machinery and they experienced the heaviest loss during the crisis period with CARs reaching -205% at the end of the period.
Cyclical services (CYCS) that include retailers, hotels and support services also had consistent negative cumulative abnormal returns and incurred CARs of -156% by the end of the crisis period. We interpret this such that the main beneficiaries of IMF bailouts are consumer oriented companies in services as well as the real sector.
*****insert table 5 here*****
In Figure 2 .c. and Table 6 we present the cumulative abnormal returns for several sectors in *****insert table 6 here*****
Reactions to IMF Announcements in Different Sectors of the Economy
The GARCH results are reported in Tables 7-9 . Because of the non-normality of returns as reported in Table 1 , all GARCH estimations are conducted using the Bollerslev and Wooldridge robust standard errors. We estimate the impact of IMF events on returns as listed in Table 1 . Significant results at the 1 and 5 percent level are bolded and indicated with (**) and (*), respectively, in all tables for ease of comparison. Table 7 reports the results for Thailand. In all cases, market index returns is significant and has the expected sign. Therefore, the coefficients we report for the market returns reflect the price of risk imposed by the IMF related announcement after market risk is priced. This means that a positive coefficient might indicate a decline in the particular sector we investigate parallel to the market but a positive reaction after market risk is priced.
Thailand
We do not observe any systematic reaction to IMF-related events. Figure 2 .a., implying that the investors correctly predicted the direction of the overall returns in these sectors. Table 8 reports the results for Indonesia. There is a significant reaction to IMF announcements in each sector. Out of total 9 announcements, there are between 5 and 9 significant responses. Again the reaction is asymmetric in all cases, supporting the results for Thailand. In terms of economic significance of the events, the January 13, 1998 event, which signaled that a bailout program is due soon, stands out. Figure 2 .b. that presents cumulative abnormal returns for the various different sectors in Indonesia. Table 9 reports the results for Korea. The market response to the news on Nov 21 that South Korea said it would seek a rescue package from the IMF was positive in the sectors of BASIC, FIN, and NCYCS, reflecting some liquidity effect associated with expected future IMF loans that would be available soon for business transactions, while other sectors had no reaction. The December 1, 1997 event about negotiating rescue package had a negative and significant impact on two sector returns: FIN and NCYCG returns declined by 2.4 and 3.1 %, respectively, suggesting that investors expected a costly reform package or had uncertainty about the rescue package program. When the IMF announced a financial support package for Korea on December 4, 1997, banking sector reacted negatively but BASIC sector had a positive reaction. The former may be explained by conditions attached to package for troubled banking sector, while the latter may be driven by liquidity considerations or implicit guarantees.
Indonesia
South Korea
All sectors, save NCYCS, reacted to an IMF board meeting news on December 15 that Washington considers a Korean request to speed up delivery of the support package. Sector returns in BANK, BASIC, CYCS and FIN went up by 2.6, 4.6, 6.7 and 5.4 percent respectively, while NCYCS returns declined by 8.2 percent. The decline in NCYCG returns, which is composed of beverages, food, health, personal care, pharmaceuticals and tobacco products, may be explained that the funds will go more to troubled sectors such as BANK and FIN. The increase in BASIC and CYCS returns could be explained by implicit guarantees. Markets reacted significantly to the news on December 2 that the IMF would make only US$2 billion available to South Korea on December 30 from the US$21 billion set aside. As expected, the impact was negative in most sectors. All sector returns declined, except that returns in NCYCS went up.
When the IMF released further funds on February 17, 1998, the reaction was mixed: BANK and FIN returns declined by 7.1 and 4.5 percent, respectively, while BASIC, CYCS and GIND returns increased by 1.5, 2.4, and 2.2 percent, respectively, indicating that the released funds welcomed more in real (industrial and goods) sectors than in financials.
*****insert table 9 here***** Out of total 36 cases, there was a significant reaction in 20 cases with 11 gains and 9 losses in returns. Compared to Thailand and Indonesia, sectors in Korea performed better as this county had positive net gainers, while others were net losers. This result can be explained by the past strong economic performance of this country, in comparison to the political and social instability in Indonesia during the time of the crisis and the fact that Thailand was the first country where the crisis was initiated.
CONCLUSION
We have investigated how investors trading in different sectors of a stock market react to the IMF announcements during abnormal times, such as a financial crisis. Previous literature has investigated this issue partially. The impact of IMF-related news on stock returns has been analyzed mainly with respect to domestic and international bank returns and general financials, as well as composite market index returns.
The missing gap in the literature, which we attempt to fill it in this paper, is the impact of IMF actions on non-financials or real sectors. This issue is important because long-run success of IMF programs may be best judged based on their impact on the real sector and their net wealth effects can be measured by evidence from both financial and real sectors.
To do so, we first have computed the abnormal returns based on a battery of IMF-related events.
The results indicate that that the IMF actions during the Asian crisis played an important role in affecting both financials and real sector returns. In general financials returns declined. In terms of non-financials, general industries and cyclical consumer goods performed better than other sectors. The results suggest that the focus of the previous literature mainly on financial sector returns may hence undermine the influence of the IMF in real sector. Next, we have estimated the impact of IMF-program and negotiations news on sector returns using time-varying models. Here we have noted that it is difficult to test whether observed changes in returns are due to liquidity effects, implicit guarantees or expectations about costly reforms. In interpreting our results, we use all as alternative explanations of changes in returns. However, an important finding is that IMF-related news influences both financials and real sector returns.
It would be interesting to provide evidence on the impact of IMF-related news on sector returns in other countries, using other episodes of crisis, such as those in Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Russia and Turkey. Our results are preliminary and they may be specific to the case of the Asian crisis. Also, using firm level data would enable us to see the reaction of individual firms with diverse characteristics. To IMF actions different degrees of implicit guarantees might be offered at the firm level or individual firms might have better or worse corporate relations with governments. Detailed analysis of qualitative newspaper level data is a clear venue for future research. This paper leads the way in examining the sector returns in the real economy as opposed to financials, using comprehensive set of IMF-related news, and we believe that the results we report here can be used as a point of reference for more detailed future studies. The Bank of Thailand calls on the IMF for technical assistance, regarding the crisis issues. July 28
Thailand calls in the IMF. August 11
The IMF unveils a rescue package for Thailand. August 20 IMF approves a US $3.9 billion credit for Thailand.
Indonesia
1997
October 8 Indonesia says it will ask the IMF for financial assistance. October 31 IMF gives Indonesia a US$23 billion financial support package.
1998
Jan 13, 1998 The IMF and Indonesia appear to be near an agreement over the IMF bailout. February 16 The IMF disagrees with Indonesia about adopting a currency board. February 17 The IMF has threatened to withhold further money under a US$43 billion bailout package if Indonesia adopts a currency board. March 9
A simmering dispute between the IMF and Indonesia March 21
The IMF and the Indonesian government have made ''considerable progress ''toward a new deal.
March 26
Indonesia said that it is close to a comprehensive package of measures to lift the country out of its worst economic crisis in three decades, which Indonesia has agreed to in exchange for a US$40 billion bailout April 8 Indonesia said that it had reached agreement with the IMF on a new package of economic reforms and targets, which the IMF would watch closely to ensure compliance
Korea
1997
Nov 21 South Korea said it would seek a rescue package from the IMF. December 1 South Korea and the IMF resumed talks on a rescue package after an initial deal floundered. December 4 A record loan package of $60 billion announced by the IMF to bailout South Korea December 15 The IMF board meeting in Washington considers a Korean request to speed up delivery of a portion of the US$60 December 24 The IMF said that it would make US$2 billion available to South Korea on December 30 from the US$21 billion set aside for the financially troubled country. The IMF plans to dole out another US$2 billion to Seoul on January 8.
1998
February 17 The IMF released a further US$2 billion to South Korea.
Source: Kho and Stulz (2000), pp. 215-16. Note: ** and * indicate 1 and 5% significance level, respectively. Reported Q and Q 2 statistics indicate the significance of serial correlation and remaining ARCH effects in returns. In all cases, these statistics are not significant at the conventional significance levels, suggesting that estimations do not suffer from serial correlation and able to account for ARCH effects when five lags are used. Note: ** and * indicate 1 and 5% significance level, respectively. Reported Q and Q 2 statistics indicate the significance of serial correlation and remaining ARCH effects in returns. In all cases, these statistics are not significant at the conventional significance levels, suggesting that estimations do not suffer from serial correlation and able to account for ARCH effects when five lags are used. Note: ** and * indicate 1 and 5% significance level, respectively. Reported Q and Q 2 statistics indicate the significance of serial correlation and remaining ARCH effects in returns. In all cases, these statistics are not significant at the conventional significance levels, suggesting that estimations do not suffer from serial correlation and able to account for ARCH effects when five lags are used. 
Figure 2 Cumulative Abnormal Returns during the Asian Crisis
We look at the changes in company values separately for each industry. We used the CAPM to calculate risk adjusted expected returns and we calculated abnormal returns for each industry accordingly. We start cumulating abnormal returns for each industry at the beginning of the research period and cumulate returns for 392 days until the end of the research period. 
